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The “role of innovation” is important to discuss not only as it relates to a 
healthy economy but also as it relates to a healthy society. Before 
continuing, a few definitions are in order:   
▪ In any society, I dare say, most people are born with a desire to create: 
to imagine or conceive new things – consider the Neanderthal who 
evidently took pleasure in drawing figures on the wall of the cave or the 
prehistoric Homo sapiens who managed to create a workable flute 
(found in a south German cave). This is artistry and invention. It is 
typically personal. 
▪ A somewhat smaller proportion of society, it appears, desires also to 
conceive new things that will be realized, or built, for use by others. A 
composer creates a new musical score, a director realizes it with a stage 
production and an impresario brings it to the public. If successful – and 
only then – it is an innovation. It is typically social. 
What is the “role” of innovation? America’s great era of innovation – 
from the 1820s to the 1960s – was pervasive, extending to virtually all 
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industries and enlisting ordinary people from the grassroots on up. 
Abraham Lincoln exclaimed in 1858 that “young America has a great 
passion – a perfect rage – for the new.” As argued in my book Mass 
Flourishing, this innovating was an engaging and sometimes exhilarating 
experience. People were involved in their work and had a sense of taking 
action and of achieving things. Now, statistical analyses show that a low 
rate of innovation in a country is a reliable predictor of low life 
satisfaction. 
II 
From this perspective, let us examine the significant shifts over the past 
year or two in the economic organization and political landscape of China, 
the U.S. and France. 
In the U.S. since around 1970, a protracted slowdown of productivity 
growth – more accurately, growth of total factor productivity – led soon to 
near-stagnation of total labor compensation and national income too, 
amidst considerable structural change. Life satisfaction, according to 
household surveys, appears to have been less satisfying to more and more 
participants. 
This development ultimately brought a shift in the political landscape. 
Many of the workers, grown dissatisfied, expressed their frustration by 
voting against the political parties that had presided over the slowdown. 
Also, the Democratic Party had been catering especially to several special 
interest groups – so-called “identity politics” – and at some point the votes 
the Party gained from special interests came to be offset by the loss of 







The politics of President Trump is opposed to that of traditional 
Democrats and Republicans. Trump seeks an economy that produces a 
huge Gross Domestic Product per working age person – with little or no 
regard to wage rates or other matters of distribution – though he expresses 
an affinity with the white working class, who constitute his political 
“base.”  
At bottom, Trump, like 1920s Mussolini, is practicing the ideology that 
is called corporatism. It is a doctrine that has generally proved to be 
fruitless for economic growth and personal satisfaction. 
The corporatist disregard for the inspirations, explorations and 
discoveries sought and achieved by persons of all walks of life is exacting 
a further toll on the vitalism prevalent in the people. The view that the role 
of the company and that of the labor union is to serve the nation, not itself, 
may further drain the nation of much of its individualism. 
In France, President Emmanuel Macron has also moved away from 
preoccupation with distribution. He wants France to regain its rapid 
growth and prestige. To that end, he has sought to create more competition 
in French industry by cutting back the “social protection” of employees, 
which has been regarded as having stifled the entry of new firms into 
industry. 
Of course, the two leaders differ. Macron hates corporatism! The tools 
of Macron are institutional reforms while those of Trump are fiscal and 
budgetary reforms. Further, Macron is an intellectual and a skilled 
politician while Trump is not. 
In China, the government under President Xi Jinping has brought forth 






China will remain fundamentally a trading nation. The reaffirmation of 
support for the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) signals that China will 
remain semi-socialist. Finally, the government implies that the purpose of 
investment is to increase consumption. But these initiatives and 
declarations are far from the whole picture. 
The state has taken initiatives aimed at boosting entrepreneurship and, 
of critical importance in the long run, innovation: shortening dramatically 
the procedure for forming a new company, building a vast number of 
additional schools in which Chinese children learn more about the world 
they will face, and facilitating entry of foreigners lending their expertise.  
The government has reiterated its dedication to protecting new patents. 
Also very important, the authorities have recognized the importance of 
allowing competition in the economy. Existing companies are freed up to 
enter new industries, thus forcing inefficient companies to contract or 
leave the industry. Competition is an invaluable solvent and the 
government shows its wisdom in opening up the economy to competition. 
There is measurable evidence that China is going down the road of 
entrepreneurship and innovation. As is becoming well-known, the number 
of new firms registering every week is huge. At this rate, there will be a 
plethora of new firms dotting the Chinese landscape. The unanswered 
question is what proportion of the new firms will be genuinely new 
enterprises – not just small shops – and, of those, what proportion will 
have new ideas and the zeal to develop them and try them in the market. 
III 
How will further development in the ‘digital economy’ impact the nations 






In the West, many technologists worry that the spread of AI in their 
economies will cause massive layoffs and a long spell of unemployment 
until wages have finally sunk to a lower growth path. They are worried not 
only about the development of AI in their own countries but also about the 
importation of AI-enabled robots developed overseas. The technologists 
are not well-trained economists, so it is high time we try to take into 
account the part that some market mechanisms will play in determining 
the effects on the path of wage rates and employment. 
Of course, the adoption of robots, whether or not AI-enabled, makes it 
possible to produce an unchanged level of output with less labor. And, 
yes, when AI-enabled robots serving to replace labor are introduced in 
some industries, the immediate impact is layoffs and reduced wages in 
those industries. But, as I see it, that is just the beginning of the story. 
What happens after that? (In what I am going to say, I will suppose for 
simplicity that there is just one kind of labor and workers are all alike.)  
There is a subsequent effect transmitted to other industries. In an 
idealized model, the displaced workers would seek employment 
elsewhere, thus driving down wage rates equally in the whole economy. 
And this general fall of wages sets in motion an adjustment mechanism. 
When wage rates go down, the rate of return to investment will go up and 
investment will pick up in response. The resulting increase of the capital 
stock will exert an upward pull on wage rates and employment in the other 
industries. 
Another adjustment mechanism: Even if, for one reason or another, 
displaced workers do not move to other industries, the wage cuts in the 






there to reduce their prices; if they don’t, new firms will enter those 
industries, thus driving down prices there. And this fall in relative prices 
means a rise of relative prices in other industries. These higher prices will 
be a force pulling up output and employment in those industries  – even if 
wage rates had not fallen. 
Another point: Even if these mechanisms ultimately perform as 
expected, it will be highly desirable to have more innovation of the old-
fashion kind – innovations of a kind that empower workers to be more 
productive, especially in consumer industries. I see several reasons why 
labor force participation remains depressed in the coal mining regions of 
America, Britain and France. The first is that the workers are not mobile, 
having invested their savings in their houses and being dependent on their 
local government for health care, which cannot quickly be transferred to 
another provinces or state. 
I will close on another note: Particularly in the nations of the West, 
there is too much focus on stability and the short run. I believe they can 
look forward to decades of exponential growth if they will come to accept 
disruptive innovations and to give their moral support to careers of 
innovation (as well as exploration). They have to understand that 
venturing into the unknown and the occasional experience of success is 
what the good life is all about. 
 
 
